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1.  Introduction 
Why do firms employ older workers but do not hire them? This question has been 
analyzed in several studies and the answers are important when considering the lower 
reemployment probabilities and often long unemployment durations of older workers as 
well as the need to activate them as a response to the upcoming demographic challenges 
(e.g., Chan and Stevens, 2001). In international comparison, unemployment rates – 
especially long-term unemployment – are relatively higher and labor force participation 
rates are relatively lower for older workers in Germany than in most OECD countries 
including the U.S., the U.K., and the Scandinavian countries (OECD, 2005). There are 
two dominant economic rationales for firms not to hire older workers (Hutchens, 1986; 
Hutchens, 1988). One is human capital theory and especially firm investments in 
specific human capital (Becker, 1962). Another is deferred compensation as an 
incentive scheme (Lazear, 1979; Lazear, 1981), on which this paper focuses. 
At first, I review the empirical literature on wage-seniority profiles as well as on hiring 
of older workers (Section 2). Next, the theory of deferred compensation as a recruitment 
barrier for older workers is discussed (Section 3). Third, a personnel data set of a large 
German company is examined (Section 4). Whereas all reviewed studies on hiring of 
older workers have used individual data across firms or establishment data sets, no 
study has analyzed personnel data of a single company. Thus, this paper is the first that 
provides an intra-firm perspective on wage profiles and employment of older workers. 
Though it is only a quantitative case study, it can help us to understand wage and 
employment policies of firms toward older workers. Furthermore, German linked 
employer-employee data (LIAB) are analyzed to allow some generalization of the 2 
 
results (Section 5). The paper concludes with a short summary and discussion (Section 
6). 
A special contribution to the literature is made by developing a new rationale why firms 
with deferred compensation schemes do not hire older workers. While deferred 
compensation is likely to foster long-term implicit contracts and ongoing employment 
of older workers, it might also discourage firms from hiring older workers. Hutchens 
(1986) developed a prominent rationale in his article “Delayed Payment Contracts and a 
Firm’s Propensity to Hire Older Workers” in the Journal of Labor Economics. 
Hutchens’ (1986) argument of deferred compensation as recruitment barrier for older 
workers, however, is solely based on the idea of fixed costs associated with deferred 
compensation. These fixed costs arise because the firm has to compensate a worker for 
the risk of being fired before the end of the contract (firm cheating). I think that there 
are good reasons to believe that in many cases the probability of such firm cheating is in 
fact close to zero (e.g., reputation effects, severance pay, employment protection laws, 
works councils and unions). These reasons make it not so likely that firms cheat on 
workers and, consequently, Hutchens’ (1986) fixed cost explanation for deferred 
compensation as recruitment barrier for older workers not so convincing anymore.  
In this paper, I propose several strategies a firm might choose to adjust the wage 
profiles for newly hired older workers in deferred compensation schemes. All 
adjustment strategies have in common that fairness (equity) perceptions of workers 
might be negatively affected because either absolute wage levels or wage growths favor 
young or old workers. If the wage policy is perceived as unfair, workers might reduce 
their work effort. A firm, therefore, might prefer not to adjust deferred compensation 
schemes and rather hire homogenous entrants in terms of entry age, which are likely to 3 
 
be young. This is a new rationale why firms with deferred compensation schemes 
employ older workers but do not hire them, which does not build on Hutchens’ (1986) 
fixed cost argument that workers need to be compensated for the risk of firm cheating 
but on possible unfairness perceptions of workers and consequent adverse incentive 
effects. 
The empirical analysis of personnel records shows that the analyzed firm employs a 
quite large share of older workers but does not hire many older workers. Estimated 
earnings functions with interaction effects between tenure and entry age indicate that 
wage-tenure profiles are adjusted according to entry age. On the one hand, workers with 
older entry age earn higher wage levels but have lower wage growths than younger 
workers at every point of tenure. On the other hand, workers with older entry age earn 
lower wage levels but have higher wage growths than younger workers at every point of 
age. This might cause inequity and downward adjustment of work effort to re-establish 
equity so that the firm might hire fewer older workers than it would otherwise do. The 
findings also hold on average for a large representative German linked employer-
employee data set. Moreover, this data set is suitable to analyze the different strategies 
firms might choose to adjust wage profiles with respect to entry age. The dominant 
strategy seems to be the same as in the analyzed single company because most firms 




2.  Previous Empirical Evidence 
2.1 Wage-Seniority Profiles 
Employment duration can be divided into general labor market experience and firm 
tenure. In the framework of human capital theory, experience serves as a proxy for 
general human capital and tenure as a proxy for firm specific human capital (Becker, 
1962). The rates of return to human capital investments are usually estimated in some 
form of the Mincer earnings function (Mincer, 1974), which mostly show a concave 
relationship between wages experience as well as tenure (Murphy and Welch, 1990; 
Polachek, 2007). However, methodological issues have been of concern as the estimated 
rates of return might be biased due to unobserved individual and job characteristics as 
well as matching quality. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) developed an instrumental 
variable approach to deal with the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. They found that 
the rates of return to tenure are much smaller than previously estimated and experience 
accounts for the largest share of wage growth during a worker’s career. Abraham and 
Farber (1987) also found a strong upward bias in the rates of return to tenure that 
reflects an omitted variable bias. Topel (1991), however, could only find a small 
upward bias in conventional OLS estimates and shows that the impact of tenure on 
wages is substantial. Though there is an ongoing debate about methodological issues 
and the size of the effects (e.g., Altonji and Williams, 2005; Dustmann and Meghir, 
2005; Zwick, 2008), it seems uncontested that seniority has a positive effect on wages.  
Whereas most studies use individual data across firms that are subject to job 
heterogeneity and measurement errors, some recent studies use personnel data of single 
companies in several countries. The estimated earnings functions in those studies reveal 5 
 
also a positive and concave relationship between wages and seniority (Medoff and 
Abraham, 1980; Medoff and Abraham, 1981; Baker et al., 1994a; Baker et al., 1994b; 
Lazear, 1999; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Treble et al., 2001; Dohmen, 2004; Grund, 
2005; Lin, 2005; Shaw and Lazear, 2008; Pfeifer, 2008). Some of these studies also 
estimate the relationship between productivity and seniority, which is less strong than 
between wages and seniority (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Medoff and Abraham, 1981; 
Lazear and Moore, 1984; Lazear, 1999; Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Dohmen, 2004; Shaw 
and Lazear, 2008). The result that wages increase more than productivity with tenure 
are not consistent with human capital theory but with the theory of deferred 
compensation as an incentive mechanism (Lazear, 1979; Lazear, 1981; Hutchens, 
1989). 
 
2.2 Hiring of Older Workers 
Hutchens (1986) argues that deferred compensation schemes impose fixed-costs to 
firms and, therefore, these firms employ older workers but prefer to hire younger 
workers. He also finds empirical evidence for the U.S. (National Longitudinal Survey of 
Men) that jobs for which older workers (over age 55) are employed but not hired are 
more likely to have pensions, long job tenure, high wages, and mandatory retirement, 
which is consistent with his argument. The existence of pensions, long tenure, and high 
wages are, however, also consistent with the theory of firm-specific human capital 
because it also imposes fixed-costs to firms (Becker, 1962; Oi, 1962). Hutchens (1988) 
shows for the U.S. (Current Population Survey) that job opportunities decline with age, 
which is also consistent with deferred compensation as well as general and specific 6 
 
human capital. Recently hired older workers (over age 55) are concentrated in a smaller 
set of occupations and industries than all older workers and recently hired younger 
workers. Hirsch et al. (2000) report in an occupation based view for the U.S. (Current 
Population Survey) that older workers (over age 50) are less likely to enter occupations 
with steeper wage profiles, pension benefits, and computer usage. Scott et al. (1995) 
show with U.S. data (own survey and Current Population Survey) that firms with health 
care plans hire fewer older workers (over age 55) and that the costs of these health care 
plans have a negative impact. Hu (2003) finds for the U.S. (Current Population Survey 
and Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey of Employer-Provided Training) that larger firms 
prefer to hire younger workers, because larger firms invest more in firm specific human 
capital and younger workers have longer potential tenure, which makes their 
employment more profitable. 
Heywood et al. (1999) find for Hong Kong (own survey) that firms hire fewer older 
workers (over age 35) and prefer to hire younger workers if their workforce is higher 
skilled, has more tenure, and gets pensions and if anticipated service length is an 
important hiring criterion. Daniel and Heywood (2007) report evidence from U.K. 
linked employer-employee data (Workplace Employment Relations Survey) that firms 
with pensions, higher average wage growth, and preference for internal recruitments 
(promotions) hire fewer older workers (over age 50). Moreover, they report mixed 
results for training, which seems to have overall a rather negative impact on hiring of 
older workers. Adams and Heywood (2007) use Australian linked employer-employee 
data (Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey) to analyze the determinants of 
being an older hire and the age when hired. They find that higher qualified workers and 
workers who received training in the firm are less likely to be an older hire and are 7 
 
significantly younger. Further, new hires tend to be younger in firms with a higher 
tenure-wage ratio as a measure of the steepness of earnings profiles. 
Heywood et al. (2008) report evidence from German establishment data (Hannover 
Firm Panel) that proxies for deferred compensation (pensions and share ownership) are 
negatively correlated with the propensity of hiring workers older than 50 years, whereas 
proxies for contemporaneous compensation (profit sharing and high wages) are 
positively correlated with the hiring of older workers. Firms with a more skilled 
workforce tend to hire younger workers. Surprisingly, financing of further training for 
blue-collar workers has a positive impact on hiring of older workers. Heywood et al. 
(2008), moreover, find that firms with pensions employ a higher share of older workers, 
whereas firms with share ownership and profit sharing employ a lower share of older 
workers in their workforce. Bellmann and Brussig (2007) also analyze German 
establishment data (IAB Establishment Panel) and find that only about a quarter of all 
firms receive applications from older workers (over age 50). Half of these firms hired 
older workers. Bellmann and Brussig (2007) conclude that job search behavior of older 
workers and signaling of firms about job opportunities for older workers play a key role 
in explaining their results. Zwick (2008) uses German linked employer-employee data 
(LIAB) to show that firms with steeper wage-tenure profiles have higher tenured 
workers but hire fewer older workers (over age 50). 
 
3.  Deferred Compensation and Adjustment of Wage-Tenure Profiles 
Lazear’s (1979; 1981) deferred compensation theory focuses on the incentive effect of 
upward sloping wage-tenure profiles. Workers receive wages below their productivity 8 
 
during the beginning of their career and wages above their productivity later in their 
career so that incentives to shirk – and to lose the higher wages – are minimized. The 
upward sloping wage profile does not reflect an increasing productivity but steeper 
wage profiles are associated with higher incentives over the entire contract length 
(Hutchens, 1989). Lazear (1979, pp. 1270-1271; 1981, pp. 610-611) argues that several 
wage paths are possible within the theory of deferred compensation, ranging from flat 
wage-tenure profiles with constant payments (e.g., bond paid by worker at the 
beginning of the contract and lump sum paid by firm at the end of the contract) to 
upward sloping linear and conventional concave wage profiles.
1  
While deferred compensation is likely to foster long-term implicit contracts and 
ongoing employment of older workers, it might also discourage firms from hiring older 
workers. This popular view is highlighted in most economic research on the hiring 
problem of older workers, which started with Hutchens’ (1986) article “Delayed 
Payment Contracts and a Firm’s Propensity to Hire Older Workers” in the Journal of 
Labor Economics. Hutchens (1986, pp. 441-442) wrote:  
“It is not, however, obvious why the firm does not hire both long-term and short-
term workers under such contracts. To introduce issues, suppose that the firm in 
figure 1 [see Figure 1 in this paper] usually hires 25-year-olds who work until age 
65. They are underpaid for the first 20 years and overpaid for the last 20 years. If 
a new 55-year-old with the same VMP as workers already with the firm applied 
for a job, would the firm hire him? Clearly, it would not hire him if it must pay the 
new worker the same wage that it pays 55-year-olds already with the firm. Since 
these previously hired older workers receive a wage that exceeds their VMP, a 
profit-maximizing firm would not pay a new worker such a high wage. The 
                                                 
1 As in Germany a legal retirement age of 65 to 67 years exists, the problem of mandatory retirement age 
in contracts discussed in Lazear (1979) is not of major concern in the German case. 9 
 
question becomes more interesting if the firm can offer a new worker a different 
wage path. One would think that the firm could enter into a 10-year contract with 
the new older worker that perhaps underpays him over the first 5 years and 
overpays him over the last 5 years. In this case why would the firm prefer the long 
contract with the young worker to the short contract with the older worker, ceteris 
paribus? 
This paper argues that the longer contract is preferred because delayed payment 
schemes imply a form of fixed costs.” 
Hutchens’ (1986) argument of deferred compensation as recruitment barrier for older 
workers is solely based on the idea of fixed costs associated with deferred 
compensation. These fixed costs arise because the firm has to compensate a worker for 
the risk of being fired before the end of the contract, in which case the firm does not pay 
the worker a lump sum at the end of the contract and retains the worker’s bond paid at 
the start of the contract. As Hutchens (1986, p. 449) acknowledges: “If workers are 
certain that the firm will not renege on the contract, the fixed cost is zero. […] Thus 
fixed costs arise only when there is a finite probability of firm cheating.”  
I think that there are good reasons to believe that in many cases the probability of firm 
cheating is in fact close to zero. Lazear already argued that reputation effects might 
induce firms not to cheat on workers (Lazear, 1981, pp. 607-608) and efficient contracts 
contain severance pay as compensation for cheating (Lazear, 1981, p. 614; see also 
James and Johnson, 2000)
2, which do not impose fixed costs on non cheating firms. 
                                                 
2 Even though German labor law does not clearly regulate severance payments, many dismissed 
employees receive severance payments that are either voluntary paid by firms or decided in court 
decisions (Grund, 2006). The upper limit of severance pay is denominated in the law. For older 
employees with many years of tenure it is 18 monthly wages. A legal reform in 2004 sets severance 
payments to 0.5 monthly wages per year of tenure. 10 
 
Moreover, unions and works councils could be efficient institutions to monitor firm 
behavior (Lazear, 1981, p. 619). In Germany, works councils are involved in layoff 
processes and often bargain severance payments in social compensation plans 
(“Sozialplan”) (Eger, 2004; Grund, 2006). Another restraint for firm cheating is the 
legal protection against dismissals like just-cause employment policies (James and 
Johnson, 2000) and age discrimination laws (Neumark and Stock, 1999; Adams, 2004).
3 
In Germany, the employer has to prove lack of capability (“personenbedingte 
Kündigung”) or misconduct (“verhaltensbedingte Kündigung”) of the dismissed 
employee and in case of layoffs due to economic reasons (“betriebsbedingte 
Kündigung”) social selection criteria (“Sozialauswahl”) have to be followed, from 
which seniority and age are two explicit criteria (Seifert and Funkel-Hötzel, 2003; Eger, 
2004; Pfeifer, 2006, pp. 134-135). All these arguments make it not so likely that firms 
cheat on workers and, therefore, Hutchens’ (1986) fixed cost explanation for deferred 
compensation as recruitment barrier for older workers not so convincing anymore. So 
ex-ante it cannot be ruled out that firms adjust wage profiles for newly hired older 
workers to maintain incentives. 
For simplicity of illustration, I use the simple case in which the upward sloping wage-
tenure profile is linear (W), productivity (VMP) is constant over the career, and young 
                                                 
3 Neumark and Stock (1999) report empirical evidence for the U.S. that age discrimination laws steepen 
age-earnings profiles, which can be interpreted as enforcement of delayed payment contracts. As firms 
would have a stronger incentive to cheat if the wage profile is steeper (Lazear, 1981, p. 608), age 
discrimination laws might serve as a precommitment mechanism that encourages workers to enter 
delayed payment contracts. Adams (2004, p. 225, footnote 8) brings forward the argument that “If laws 
allay worker fears that a firm will renege completely (as would be the case if enforcement of the laws 
were strong and punishment severe), we could see the fixed hiring cost associated with delayed payment 
contracts described by Hutchens disappear.” 11 
 
and old workers have the same productivity. Capital markets are perfect, the rate of 
discount is zero, and the present value of W is equal to the present value of VMP over 
the entire contract length. The general case is depicted in Figure 1 and similar to Lazear 
(1979, p. 1265; 1981, p. 607) and Hutchens (1986, p. 441). For the purpose of this 
paper, it is helpful not only to consider tenure (see diagram at the top) but also age (see 
diagram at the bottom) on the abscissas. As Hutchens (1986, p. 441, see above quote) 
has pointed out, a firm would certainly not hire an older worker (e.g., 55-year-old with 
10 years of contract length) if he receives the same wage as workers at the same age, 
who are already with the firm and have been underpaid at the beginning of the contract, 
because this new older worker would be paid above his VMP throughout the entire 
contract length (see diagram at the bottom of Figure 1). On the other hand, an older 
worker would certainly not agree to work for the same entry wage as a young worker 
because he would be underpaid throughout the remaining contract length if both 
workers would have the same wage-tenure profile (see diagram at the top of Figure 1). I 
suggest simple adjustment strategies of delayed compensation to solve this dilemma. In 
order to make the adjustment strategies concrete, I consider a young worker at the entry 
age of 25 with 40 years of contract length and an old worker at the entry age of 55 with 
10 years of contract length.
4 Note that throughout the subsequent discussion the terms 
young and old workers refer to the entry age and not to the actual age and that wage-
tenure profiles and not wage-age profiles are discussed even if age is on the abscissa.   
-  insert Figure 1 about here 
                                                 
4 I assume a legal retirement age of 65 years for both workers. This example is similar to Hutchens 
(1986). 12 
 
Figure 1 also includes possible adjustment strategies. At first, the firm could offer the 
young and the old worker the same entry wages. The wage-tenure profile needs to be 
steeper for the old worker so that he participates. However, the firm could offer the 
young and the old worker also the same slope of wage-tenure profiles. In this scenario, 
the entry wage needs to be higher for the old worker so that he participates. If the firm 
pays a high enough entry wage to the old worker, the wage-tenure profile could even be 
flatter for the old worker than for the young worker. As the firm would never pay an 
entry wage above the productivity and a flatter wage-tenure profile has lower incentive 
effects, the adjustment possibilities are constrained.
5 The scenarios indicate a negative 
correlation between entry wages and wage growth within deferred compensation 
schemes. 
Let us now consider fairness concerns and possible adverse incentive effects resulting 
from adjustment strategies of deferred compensation. According to equity theory, a 
worker feels unfairly treated and will reduce his work effort if the ratio between his 
outcomes and his inputs is lower than the ratio for other workers in a reference group 
(e.g., Adams, 1965; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Rees, 1993; Pfeifer, 2009a). All 
adjustment strategies of deferred compensation imply that a worker’s present value of 
total income equals his present value of productivity over the entire contract length. If 
W is the wage (outcome), VMP the value of marginal product (input), and t a time index 
for tenure, we can write this assumption as ∑Wt=∑VMPt. If we now consider young 
workers, denoted with Y, and old workers, denoted with O, it is ∑WYt=∑VMPYt as well 
as ∑WOt=∑VMPOt. For rational workers equity between young and old is always given 
                                                 
5 In the extreme case, the firm could pay a worker an entry wage that equals his productivity without any 
future wage growth; thus, no delayed payment is used anymore.  13 
 
because  ∑WYt/∑VMPYt=∑WOt/∑VMPOt=1, which can be rewritten as 
∑WYt/∑WOt=∑VMPYt/∑VMPOt=1. However, workers might not be that rational and 
short-term concerns might also be important to workers (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1986; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1987; Thaler et al. 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 
Kahneman, 2003). Hence, emotional fairness perceptions at every point in time might 
matter and distort equity. If we assume that VMPY=VMPO and VMP is constant over 
time, only WYt and WOt play a role and unfairness evolves if WYt≠WOt or WYt/WOt≠1, 
respectively.  
On the one hand, all three adjustment scenarios imply that the wage of the old worker is 
higher than the wage of the young worker at every point of tenure (WYt<WOt), which 
means that the young worker might perceive his outcome as unfair and reduces his 
inputs, i.e., he reduces his VMPY to establish equity again. On the other hand, an old 
worker might compare himself with workers at the same age who have entered the firm 
when they were young. As the adjustment scenarios have shown that the wage of the 
old worker is lower than the wage of the young worker at every point of age a 
(WYa>WOa), the old worker might perceive his outcome as unfair and reduces his inputs, 
i.e., he reduces his VMPO to re-establish equity. In addition to the wage level W, 
workers might also interpret wage growth dW as outcome so that unfairness evolves if 
dWYt≠dWOt (dWYt/dWOt≠1) or dWYa≠dWOa (dWYa/dWOa≠1).
6   
Overall, all adjustment strategies can lead to adverse incentive effects if workers’ entry 
ages differ, either because the absolute wage levels or wage growths favor the young or 
                                                 
6 Several studies report that wage growth has a positive effect on satisfaction as a proxy for utility and a 
negative effect on quit behavior, which is negatively correlated with utility (e.g., Galizzi and Lang, 1998; 
Clark, 1999; Grund and Sliwka, 2007; Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom, 2007; Cornelissen, 2009). 14 
 
the old worker. A firm might, therefore, prefer not to adjust deferred compensation 
schemes and to hire homogenous entrants in terms of entry age. Because a firm usually 
faces more young than old job applicants (Bellmann and Brussig, 2007), it is rational to 
recruit young workers. If the firm recruits an older worker, this older worker needs to 
have a sufficient high productivity to offset the adverse incentive effects. This can be 
interpreted quite similar as handicapping of outside job applicants to maintain 
incentives for insiders in tournament models (Chan, 1996; Pfeifer, 2009b). The 
presented fairness and adverse incentive argument is a new rationale why firms with 
deferred compensation schemes employ older workers but do not hire them, which does 
not build on Hutchens’ (1986) fixed cost argument that workers need to be compensated 
for the risk of firm cheating. 
 
4.  Evidence from Personnel Data 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The personnel data set was extracted from computerized personnel records of a large 
German limited liability company that produces innovative products for the world 
market. The company has a works council and is subject to an industry wide collective 
contract. The personnel records contain information on all employees in the company’s 
headquarter on a monthly basis from January 1999 to December 2005. The subsequent 
empirical analyses focus on white-collar workers as deferred compensation is more 
important in white-collar jobs than in blue-collar jobs. Apprentices, trainees, employees 
in early retirement schemes, and employees who are absent on a permanent basis (e.g., 15 
 
parental leave) are excluded from the sample. The used sample includes 73,293 monthly 
observations of 1,250 white-collar workers in an unbalanced panel design.
7 
Table 1 informs about age and entry age categories across the sample. It can be seen 
that entry age is significantly lower than age and that entry age has less variance than 
age. About 3 percent of the workers are under 25 years old, 21 percent are between 25 
and 35 years, 36 percent are between 35 and 45 years, 30 percent are between 45 and 55 
years, and 10 percent are over 55 years. 37 percent of these workers have entered the 
firm when they were younger than 25 years, 46 percent were between 25 and 35 years, 
14 percent were between 35 and 45 years, 2.5 percent were between 45 and 55 years, 
and almost no worker has an entry age over the age of 55 years. Thus, even though the 
firm employs many old workers, it seldom hires an old worker. This finding, however, 
might not necessarily reflect discrimination of older workers but simply less 
applications of older workers for new jobs (Bellmann and Brussig, 2007). 
Unfortunately, no information about not hired applicants is available in the data. 
-  insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Wage-Tenure Profiles and Entry Age 
The personnel data are used to analyze the effect of tenure on wages and the effect of 
differences in entry age on wage-tenure profiles. The dependent variable is the log of 
real hourly wages measured in 1999 Euros (see Appendix A for details about the 
computation of real wages). The regressors are tenure in years and its higher terms, 
                                                 
7 For a detailed description of the personnel data see Pfeifer (2009c). 16 
 
dummies for the entry age categories, a female dummy, and dummies for highest 
schooling degrees. As was shown in the descriptive statistics that virtually no worker 
older than 55 years has entered the firm, this last category is merged with the category 
45 to 55 years, which results into the new entry age category older than 45 years. Table 
2 informs about the descriptive statistics of the variables.  
-  insert Table 2 about here 
To exploit the panel nature of the data, I estimate earnings functions with random 
effects GLS (generalized least squares) as well as fixed effects (within estimator) OLS 
(see Appendix B for a description of random and fixed effects models). In all random 
effects estimates the Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier test shows that the 
random effects model is more appropriate than cross sectional OLS, because the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the random effects equals zero is rejected at high 
significance levels. In all fixed effects estimates the F-test indicates that the fixed effects 
are jointly significant at high levels. The underlying assumption in the random effects 
model of no correlation between the random effects and the covariates might be critical 
and random effects estimators might be inconsistent, whereas the fixed effects 
estimators might be inefficient. Hence, the Hausman (1978) specification test is applied 
to compare results between the random effects and the fixed effects models. Though 
differences between the two models are small
8, the Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no systematic differences in all estimates at high significance levels 
                                                 
8 Let νi denote the worker specific effect and εit the ‘usual’ residual. σν and σε are larger zero in all 
estimates so that the random effects model uses information available from the between and the within 
estimator. However, as σν is significantly larger than σε and the fraction of variance due to νi is larger 0.9, 
the random effects results are close to the fixed effects results. For further descriptions of the random 
effects and fixed effects models see Appendix B. 17 
 
except for one specification (linear tenure in Table 3). The fixed effects model is, 
therefore, the more appropriate estimation strategy. A disadvantage of the fixed effects 
model is, however, that only wages and tenure vary over time so that no coefficients for 
the time invariant variables entry age, gender, and schooling can be estimated, i.e., no 
information about wage levels for entry age can be obtained.  
The results for the average impact of tenure on wages are presented in Table 3. Tenure 
is included in a linear fashion in the first specification for the random effects model and 
in the second specification for the fixed effects model. One year more tenure increases 
the wage on average by 1.5 percent. Specifications three and four include also higher 
terms of tenure until the quartic term to allow for non-linearity (Murphy and Welch, 
1990). The estimated wage-tenure profiles are concave and flatten out strongly after 
approximately 20 years of tenure. The time invariant control variables in the random 
effects models show furthermore that workers entering the firm with higher entry age 
receive a significant wage premium. Compared to workers with an entry age below 25 
years, workers with an entry age between 25 and 35 years earn about 11 percent higher 
wages, workers with an entry age between 35 and 45 years earn about 24 percent more, 
and workers with an entry age over 45 years earn about 43 percent higher wages. This 
result can be interpreted in the way that older workers with the same tenure as younger 
workers earn ceteris paribus higher wages. One explanation can be the adjustment of 
wage profiles in the context of deferred compensation. Another explanation might be 
higher productivity due to acquisition of general human capital before entering the firm. 
Moreover, women earn on average about 16 percent lower wages than men.
9 The results 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of the gender wage gap in the analyzed firm see Pfeifer and Sohr (2008). 18 
 
for schooling indicate a wage premium for workers with a high school degree of about 4 
percent and with a university degree of about 31 percent compared to workers with less 
than high school degrees. 
-  insert Table 3 about here 
The impact of entry age on wage-tenure profiles is analyzed in re-estimating the 
previous specifications with additional interaction terms between entry age categories 
and tenure (see Table 4). Note that entry age categories are time invariant but can still 
be interacted with tenure in fixed effects models without obtaining a wage level effect 
for entry age. Even though the results of the linear specifications of tenure are included 
in the regression tables, only the results of the non-linear treatment of tenure will be 
discussed. As the interpretation of the coefficients is quite complex, the results are 
illustrated in graphs. 
-  insert Table 4 about here 
Figure 2 informs about the results of the fixed effects model. As no information on the 
wage level is obtained from the fixed effects estimates, the predicted wage index is 
plotted over tenure, which starts with a wage level of 100 at the beginning of 
employment for all entry age groups. The wage-tenure profiles are flatter for each older 
entry age category. For example after the first ten years of tenure, the youngest entry 
age group has experienced a total wage growth of almost 36 percent, workers with an 
entry age between 25 and 35 years a wage growth of almost 31 percent, workers with an 
entry age between 35 and 45 years a wage growth of almost 22 percent, and workers in 
the oldest entry age group only a wage growth of about 15 percent.  
-  insert Figure 2 about here 19 
 
Figure 3 plots the random effects results, which enables the inclusion of wage levels. 
The slopes of the wage-tenure profiles are virtually identical to the fixed effects 
estimates. From the upper diagram can be seen that not only entry wages of older entry 
age workers are higher but wage levels throughout the career, i.e., at every point of 
tenure older entry age workers earn higher wages than younger entry age workers. 
While the upper diagram illustrates the wage-tenure profiles from a tenure perspective, 
the diagram at the bottom illustrates them from an age perspective. For this purpose the 
wage-tenure profiles are positioned to the right by an additional 10 years for every older 
entry age category.
10 From this age perspective can be seen that workers in older entry 
age categories earn lower wages but have higher wage growths than workers at the same 
age with longer tenure (younger entry age categories). 
-  insert Figure 3 about here 
The findings strongly support the view that the analyzed firm adjusts wage profiles 
according to the entry age of new workers. But the results also show that adjustment of 
deferred compensation is a source of inequity. From a tenure perspective, wages are 
higher and wage growths are lower at every point of tenure for workers with older entry 
age. From an age perspective, wages are lower and wage growths are higher at every 
point of age for workers with older entry age. Consequently, young and old workers 
might adjust work effort downwards to re-establish equity. These adverse incentive 
effects due to fairness perceptions might be the rationale for the firm not to hire more 
older workers even if wage-tenure profiles can be adjusted with respect to entry age.  
                                                 
10 The adjustment by 10 years per entry age category is feasible because means as well as minima and 
maxima in entry age differ by approximately 10 years between categories. 20 
 
 
5.  Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data 
5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A large representative data set is used in this section to allow some generalization of the 
previous findings. Since we are interested in wage-tenure profiles in firms, the 
necessary data needs to be a linked employer-employee data set, which contains 
information on as many workers in a given firm as possible. The linked employer-
employee data set at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), called LIAB, fulfills 
this requirement (Alda et al., 2005). The LIAB links employer side information from 
the IAB Establishment Panel with employee information from process-produced person 
specific data.  
The IAB Establishment Panel is a yearly survey that includes a random sample of firms 
with at least one employee covered by social security. The sample is drawn from 
stratification cells of establishment size classes and industries. The firms are asked 
about their employment structure, personnel policy etc. For the purpose of this study, 
information about commitment to union bargained collective contracts, existence of a 
works council, the share of qualified employees, establishment age, location in East 
Germany, establishment size, and industry are used, which are all available on a yearly 
basis. The process-produced person specific data stems basically from the notification 
procedure for unemployment, pension, and health insurances. At the start and at the end 
of an employment relationship as well as on the last day of each year, employers have to 
notify the social security agencies about all employees that are covered by social 
security. The information used for the subsequent analysis are gender, age, tenure, entry 21 
 
age, schooling, and daily wage in Euros. The daily wage is censored at the upper 
earnings limit for social security contributions, i.e., we observe too low wages for high 
wage workers (see Appendix C for a discussion of the censored wage problem).
11 
Another problem is that the data comprise no information about working hours. 
Therefore, only fulltime employed white-collar workers aged from 18 to 65 years, who 
are covered by social security, are included in the analysis. As earnings functions on the 
firm-level are estimated in the next section, only firms with at least 100 workers in 
every observation year are included. The final sample contains 3,997,114 yearly 
observations of 1,526,575 fulltime white-collar workers in 3,109 different firms in an 
unbalanced panel design for the period from 2000 to 2005.
12 The average nominal daily 
wage is 115.59 Euros (standard deviation of 33.49), the average log nominal wage is 4.7 
(SD=0.32), mean tenure is 10.05 years (SD=7.95), and mean entry age is 31.47 years 
(SD=9.18).
13 
Table 5 informs about age and entry age categories across the entire sample. The results 
are quite similar to the results from the personnel data as entry age is significantly lower 
than age. Only a little more than a quarter of all employed workers is younger than 35 
years, whereas more than two thirds of the workers have entered their firm at an age 
below 35 years. Even though more than ten percent of the workers are now older than 
55 years, less than one percent has entered the firm at an age above 55. Hence, the 
                                                 
11 Approximately eleven percent of the workers in the final sample have right-censored wages. 
12 I use the cross section version of the LIAB for the years 2000 to 2005 because the sample size of the 
IAB Establishment panel was increased in 2000 and because the notification procedure for social security 
has changed in 1999 (for detailed information about the LIAB like data description and codebooks see 
http://fdz.iab.de). 
13 Descriptive statistics for all control variables can be requested from the author. 22 
 
statement that firms employ older workers but do not hire them is also valid in this large 
representative data set. 
-  insert Table 5 about here 
 
5.2 Wage-Tenure Profiles and Entry Age 
Because wages are censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions, 
censored regression models are applied to estimate earnings functions (see Appendix 
C). For censored regression models only random effects estimators are available, which 
have the advantage of enabling us to look at wage effects of entry age, too. The previous 
estimates with personnel data in Section 4.2 are largely replicated. The main difference 
is that the dependent variable is now the log of nominal daily wages instead of the log 
of real hourly wages. Included time dummies for observation years cover the issue of 
real wages as well as other aggregated influences. Furthermore, the regressions include 
additional control variables.  
Table 6 informs about the results across the entire sample of all workers in all firms. 
The overall results confirm the findings from the analysis with personnel data. First, 
wages increase on average with tenure and entry age. Second, wage-tenure profiles are 
adjusted according to entry age, i.e., older entry age workers earn on average significant 
higher wages but have on average significant lower wage growth.
14 
                                                 
14 The results for the control variables are as usual (e.g., women earn lower wages, higher educated 
workers earn higher wages, wages in East Germany are lower, wages are on average higher in firms with 
collective contracts and works councils) and can be requested from the author. 23 
 
-  insert Table 6 about here 
As different firms might pursue different adjustment strategies, the earnings functions 
are re-estimated for every single firm.
15 The first specification includes only tenure and 
entry age in years as well as the control variables. The second specification includes the 
additional interaction term between tenure and entry age. The distributions (kernel 
density estimation using Epanechnikov kernel function) of the estimated coefficients are 
depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. It can be seen that wages are positively correlated 
with tenure and entry age in almost all firms (see Figure 4). Moreover, many firms 
adjust wage-tenure profiles according to entry age, mostly with flatter wage-tenure 
profiles for older entry age workers (see Figure 5).       
-  insert Figure 4 about here 
-  insert Figure 5 about here 
In the theoretical part of this paper (see Section 3), I have assumed that firms can adjust 
wage-tenure profiles in simple ways. On the one hand, firms can pay the same entry 
wage to young and old workers and offer old workers steeper wage profiles than young 
workers. On the other hand, firms can pay old workers higher entry wages to reduce the 
slope of their wage profiles. Thus, we should expect a negative correlation between the 
estimated coefficients for entry age and the coefficients for the interaction term between 
entry age and tenure. Indeed, a significant correlation coefficient of -0.65 is calculated, 
i.e., if entry age is more positively correlated with earnings, the wage-tenure profiles for 
older entry age workers are on average flatter in these firms. Figure 6 depicts the 
                                                 
15 Only the linear specifications 3 and 4 in Table 6 are re-estimated on the firm-level to obtain a feasible 
number of coefficients so that they can be interpreted and their distribution across firms can be illustrated.  24 
 
distributions of the estimated coefficients for entry age separately for firms with steeper 
(positive coefficient for the interaction term between entry age and tenure) and flatter 
(negative coefficient for the interaction term between entry age and tenure) wage-tenure 
profiles for older new entrants. Firms, in which older entry age workers have steeper 
wage-tenure profiles than younger workers, do not pay much higher entry wages, 
whereas firms, in which older entry age workers have flatter wage-tenure profiles than 
younger workers, pay significant higher entry wages. It should be noted that more than 
80 percent of the firms in the sample pursue the latter adjustment strategy with flatter 
wage profiles and higher entry wages for older new entrants. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the adjustments of wage-tenure profiles discussed in Section 3. 
-  insert Figure 6 about here 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The theoretical part of this paper has challenged Hutchens’ (1986) fixed cost 
explanation for deferred compensation as recruitment barrier for older workers because 
there are several reasons why these fixed costs might be close to zero, especially in the 
German case (reputation effects, severance payments, unions, works councils, 
employment protection laws). Adjustment of wage profiles with respect to entry age 
was discussed in the context of deferred compensation. A disadvantage of all 
adjustment scenarios is that fairness concerns might be important to workers in the 
short-term (equity theory). Workers might feel unfairly treated and reduce their work 
effort if they receive lower wage levels or wage growths than workers in a comparison 
group. Thus, a firm might prefer to hire rather homogeneous workers in terms of entry 25 
 
age, which are likely to be younger workers because relatively fewer older workers 
apply for new jobs. This fairness argument is a new rationale in the literature why firms 
with deferred compensation schemes employ older workers but do not hire them. 
The empirical analyses of personnel records and linked employer-employee data 
confirms that firms employ many old workers but seldom hire old workers although 
adjustments of wage profiles according to entry age occur. Estimated wage and wage 
growth profiles show that inequity perceptions and consequential adverse incentive 
effects might indeed arise. On the one hand, workers with older entry age earn higher 
wage levels but have lower wage growths than younger workers at every point of 
tenure. On the other hand, workers with older entry age earn lower wage levels but have 
higher wage growths than younger workers at every point of age. Firms might hire 
fewer older workers than they would do otherwise to avoid such inequality. Results 
from the linked employer-employee data, furthermore, support the theoretical 
consideration that firms have different adjustment strategies. Whereas most firms pay 
older new entrants higher entry wages and flatter wage-tenure profiles than young new 
entrants, some firms pay older new entrants steeper wage profiles but then without 
higher entry wages. This negative correlation between entry wages and wage growth is 
again consistent with the theoretical considerations made in this paper.    
Both used data sets have their advantages and disadvantages. An obvious limitation of 
the personnel data set is that results of such a quantitative case study cannot per se be 
generalized. So a large representative linked employer-employee data set is examined, 
which unfortunately has the disadvantage of censored daily wages and no information 
about working hours. Wages and working hours are, however, precisely measured in the 26 
 
personnel data set. The combination of both data sets gives the fundamental results 
more persuasive power.  
Another major limitation of the empirical analysis is that worker productivity is 
observed neither in one data set nor the other. Information about productivity would be 
ideal to distinguish accurately between deferred compensation and human capital effects 
on wage profiles. Nevertheless, the presented results from personnel record as well as 
linked employer-employee data are strongly consistent with the theoretical 
considerations about adverse incentive effects from adjustments of deferred 
compensation schemes as a recruitment barrier for older workers. Human capital 
explanations for the adjustment of wage profiles with respect to entry age, however, are 
not completely in line with the results as discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.  
If we assume, on the one hand, that human capital is entirely general, productivity and 
earnings would be positively correlated with age as proxy for experience but not with 
tenure. Thus, older new entrants should earn higher entry wages than younger workers 
but the effect on the slope of the earnings profile should be different from the deferred 
compensation model. Linear wage profiles would imply the same slope for old and 
young new entrants. Concave wage profiles would imply the same slope from an age 
perspective but flatter wage profiles for older workers from a tenure perspective. If we 
assume, on the other hand, that human capital is entirely firm specific, productivity and 
earnings would be positively correlated with tenure but not with age. This implies that 
old and young workers earn the same entry wages and have the same wage-tenure 
profiles because they do not differ in their productivity. In an age perspective and with 
concave profiles, however, the older new entrant would have a steeper wage-tenure 
profile than the younger worker.  27 
 
While the estimated adjustment of wage profiles in personnel data is in line with some 
of these implications, it also shows inconsistencies. First, it is inconsistent within the 
general human capital framework that concave wage profiles are steeper for older new 
entrants in the age perspective as found in the data. Second, the positive correlation of 
entry wages and entry age is inconsistent within the firm specific human capital 
framework. Since general and specific human capital often go hand in hand in the real 
world, the effects of entry age on human capital acquisition and hence on productivity 
and wages are far more complex. For example, the general part of human capital could 
be responsible for higher entry wages for older workers, whereas the specific part could 
be responsible for steeper profiles in an age perspective. Thus, further theoretical as 
well as empirical research, ideally with data on wages as well as productivity and 
training investments, is necessary to fully understand the mechanisms behind age-
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Appendix A: Computation of Real Wages in Personnel Data 
Several earnings functions are estimated in Section 4.2 to analyze the effects of tenure 
and entry age on wages as well as the effect of entry age on wage-tenure profiles. The 
personnel data set contains nominal hourly gross wages in Euros. As wages are 
estimated at different points in time, real wages are the preferable outcome variable.
16 
For this purpose, I have estimated cross sectional earnings functions with OLS, in which 
the log of nominal wages is the dependent variable and the observation month is the 
only regressor (see Table A.1 for the results). The obtained coefficient is approximately 
0.002, which means that workers experience on average a monthly nominal wage 
growth of 0.2 percent or a yearly nominal wage growth of 2.5 percent. As these values 
are only slightly higher than the inflation rate and quite similar to the average wage 
growth of union negotiated wages in Germany, the results are plausible. The nominal 
wage of each worker in each month is then divided by one plus the obtained coefficient 
of the time trend times the number of months minus one.
17 Real wages are therefore 
measured in January 1999 Euros.  
Table A.1 also contains a comparison of mean nominal and real wages in January 1999, 
which are of course identical, and in December 2005. More interesting is the 
comparison between mean real wages in January 1999 and December 2005, which 
shows that average real wage growth has not been very large (0.53 percent in seven 
                                                 
16 Note that the inclusion of time fixed effects might interfere with tenure in individual fixed effects 
models which exploit only the within variance (see Appendix B).  
17 The month (t: time trend) variable ranges from 1 (January 1999) to 84 (December 2005). The 
computation formula is  ( ) ,real ,nominal /1 ( 1 ) tt WW t =+ − β . 34 
 
years). Thus, the presented regression results for tenure and entry age do not simply 
reflect a nominal wage growth but represent the effects of the variables.  
Table A.1: Computation of real wages in personnel data 
  
OLS for log nominal wages  






Mean log nominal wage  3.1150 
Mean hourly wages in Euros  
Nominal wage (January 1999, t=1)  21.2803 
Real wage (January 1999, t=1)  21.2803 
Nominal wage (December 2005, t=84)  25.1784 
Real wage (December 2005, t=84)  21.3930 
Wage growth 01/1999 – 12/2005  
Nominal wage growth (%)  18.3179 
Real wage growth (%)  0.5296 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. Coefficients significant at *** 1%. 





Appendix B: The Panel Estimators 
The basic model of the earnings function is equation (B.1), in which i is a worker index 
and t a time index. Further, w denotes the log hourly wage, α a constant, X’ a vector of 




it it i it wX α βν ε =+ ++ 
From (B.1) the between estimator in (B.2) can be derived. 
 (B.2) 
'
ii i i wX α βν ε =+ ++ 
The within estimator of the fixed effects model in (B.3) is then derived by subtracting 
(B.2) from (B.1). It can be seen that time invariant covariates are dropped in the fixed 
effects model. 
 (B.3)  () ( ) ( )
''
it i it i it i ww X X β εε − =− + −  
The random effects model in (B.4) uses a weighted average of the estimates of the 
between estimator in (B.2) and the within estimator in (B.3), in which θ is a function of 
σν
2 and σε
2. θ would be zero if σν
2=0, i.e., the worker specific residuals are always zero 
and the between estimator would contain all information. θ would be one if σε
2=0, i.e., 
the fixed effects estimator would contain all information.        
 (B.4)  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
'' 11 it i it i i it i ww X X θ θα θ β θν ε θ ε −= −+ − + −+ −  
For a further discussion and assumptions of the models see for example Wooldridge 
(2002, pp. 247-291), Greene (2003, pp. 283-334), and Stata (2007, pp. 390-413). 36 
 
Appendix C: Censored Wages in Linked Employer-Employee Data 
The daily wages in the LIAB are right censored at the upper earnings limit for social 
security contributions. Hence, we observe too low wages (wages equal the social 
security contribution limit) for high wage workers (wages above the social security 
contribution limit). This likely leads to a downward bias of the estimated effects of 
tenure and entry age in OLS regressions because workers with long tenure and older 
entry age earn high wages. Censored (interval) regression models account for this 
problem by incorporating the censoring probability in the log-likelihood function. If 
only one censoring level would exist, a Tobit model could be estimated. The upper 
earnings limits for social security contributions, however, have changed from year to 
year (144 Euros in 2000, 146 Euros in 2001, 148 Euros in 2002, 168 Euros in 2003, 169 
Euros in 2004, and 171 Euros in 2005) so that the more general censored regression 
model is appropriate. 
The basic regression model of the earnings function is equation (C.1), in which i is a 
worker index and t a time index. Further, w* denotes the latent log daily wage, X’ a 
vector of covariates, β a vector of coefficients, and ε the ‘usual’ residual. 
 (C.1) 
*'
it it it wX β ε =+  
Because wages in period t are only observed for wage levels below the censoring value 
c in period t, the observed dependent variable is w=w* if w*<c and w=c if w*≥c. The 
first (uncensored) case (w=w*) occurs with the probability in (C.2) and the second 
(censored) case (w=c) with the probability in (C.3). 37 
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The generated log-likelihood function, which has to be maximized, looks consequently 
as in equation (C.4). 
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∑∑  
Unfortunately only a random effects estimator is available for censored regression 
models. For a further discussion of censored regression models and random effects 
estimation see for example Wooldridge (2002, pp. 517-544), Greene (2003, pp. 761-
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Figure 1: Adjustment strategies of deferred compensation39 
 
Table 1: Age and entry age categories in personnel data 
       Age categories (share in %) 
   Mean  Std.  Dev. <25  25-35 35-45 45-55  >55  Total 
Age  42.17  9.44  3.26  20.96 36.31 29.68  9.79 100.00 
Entry  age 28.32 7.38 36.92  46.08  14.41  2.58 0.02  100.00 
Difference 13.85  2.06  -33.66  -25.12  21.90 27.10 9.77  0.00 






Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables in personnel data 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Real hourly wage in January 1999 Euros  21.4731  6.2041  7.5592  76.0312 
Log real hourly wage  3.0300  0.2664  2.0228  4.3311 
Tenure in years  13.8075  9.5938  0.0055  48.2000 
Entry age in years  28.3218  7.3756  13.7041  60.7890 
Entry age <25 (dummy, reference group)  0.3692  0.4826  0  1 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy)  0.4608  0.4985  0  1 
Entry age 35-45 (dummy)  0.1441  0.3511  0  1 
Entry age >45 (dummy)  0.0260  0.1590  0  1 
Female (dummy)  0.2753  0.4467  0  1 
Schooling less than high school degree (“Haupt-/ 
Realschule”) (dummy, reference group)  0.4846  0.4998  0  1 
Schooling high school degree (“Abitur”) (dummy)  0.1632  0.3696  0  1 
Schooling university degree (dummy)  0.3522  0.4776  0  1 
Note: Schooling degrees are the highest obtained degrees of workers. Wages and tenure vary over time. 







 Table 3: Tenure, entry age and wages in personnel data 
  (1) RE  (2) FE  (3) RE  (4) FE 
Tenure  (years)  0.0150*** 0.0150*** 0.0410*** 0.0411*** 
  [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Tenure squared / 100      -0.1382***  -0.1383*** 
     [0.0042]  [0.0042] 
Tenure cubed / 1000      0.0203***  0.0202*** 
     [0.0017]  [0.0017] 
Tenure quartic / 10000      -0.0011***  -0.0010*** 
     [0.0002]  [0.0002] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy)  0.1175***    0.1037***   
  [0.0147]  [0.0146]  
Entry age 35-45 (dummy)  0.2192***    0.2130***   
  [0.0188]  [0.0187]  
Entry age >45 (dummy)  0.3610***    0.3614***   
  [0.0315]  [0.0312]  
Female  (dummy)  -0.1523***  -0.1492***  
  [0.0133]  [0.0132]  
Schooling high school degree (dummy)  0.0465***    0.0363**   
  [0.0167]  [0.0166]  
Schooling university degree (dummy)  0.2673***    0.2730***   
  [0.0141]  [0.0140]  
Constant  2.6566*** 2.8232*** 2.5847*** 2.7347*** 
  [0.0122] [0.0013] [0.0121] [0.0014] 
R-squared  (within)  0.2533 0.2533 0.3825 0.3825 
R-squared  (between)  0.5151 0.0886 0.5079 0.0867 
R-squared  (overall)  0.4968 0.0958 0.4887 0.0969 
Breusch Pagan test for random effects (χ
2)  1911052***  1929421***  
F-test for fixed effects    861***    1031*** 
Hausman test (χ
2) 0.5116  49.4669*** 
Note: Random effects GLS (specifications 1 and 3) and fixed effects (within estimator) OLS (specifications 2 and 
4) for log real hourly wages. Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients and test values are significant at * 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. Reference group for entry age categories is entry age less than 25 years. Reference group for 




Table 4: Interaction effect of entry age and tenure on wages in personnel data 
  (1) RE  (2) FE  (3) RE  (4) FE 
Tenure  (years)  0.0149*** 0.0149*** 0.0450*** 0.0450*** 
  [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.0008] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy) * Tenure  0.0002  0.0002  0.0055***  0.0055*** 
  [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
Entry age 35-45 (dummy) * Tenure  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0133***  -0.0133*** 
  [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0014] [0.0014] 
Entry age >45 (dummy) * Tenure  -0.0016**  -0.0011  -0.0248***  -0.0254*** 
  [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0041] [0.0041] 
Tenure squared / 100      -0.0935***  -0.0935*** 
     [0.0074]  [0.0074] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy) * Tenure squared / 100      -0.1716***  -0.1714*** 
     [0.0106]  [0.0106] 
Entry age 35-45 (dummy) * Tenure squared / 100      -0.0006  0.0012 
     [0.0224]  [0.0224] 
Entry age >45 (dummy) * Tenure squared / 100      0.0562  0.0874 
     [0.1148]  [0.1151] 
Tenure cubed / 1000      -0.0027  -0.0028 
     [0.0027]  [0.0027] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy) * Tenure cubed / 1000      0.0756***  0.0756*** 
     [0.0045]  [0.0045] 
Entry age 35-45 (dummy) * Tenure cubed / 1000      -0.0134  -0.0142 
     [0.0137]  [0.0137] 
Entry age >45 (dummy) * Tenure cubed / 1000      -0.0344  -0.0603 
     [0.1058]  [0.1060] 
Tenure quartic / 10000      0.0018***  0.0018*** 
     [0.0003]  [0.0003] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy) * Tenure quartic / 10000      -0.0100***  -0.0100*** 
     [0.0006]  [0.0006] 
Entry age 35-45 (dummy) * Tenure quartic / 10000      0.0064**  0.0066** 
     [0.0027]  [0.0027] 
Entry age >45 (dummy) * Tenure quartic / 10000      0.0170  0.0235 
     [0.0318]  [0.0318] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy)  0.1155***    0.1876***   
  [0.0147]  [0.0145]  
Entry age 35-45 (dummy)  0.2214***    0.3555***   
  [0.0187]  [0.0184]  
Entry age >45 (dummy)  0.3681***    0.5169***   
  [0.0312]  [0.0305]  
Female  (dummy)  -0.1522***  -0.1527***  
  [0.0131]  [0.0128]  
Schooling high school degree (dummy)  0.0464***    0.0591***   
  [0.0165]  [0.0160]  
Schooling university degree (dummy)  0.2670***    0.2691***   
  [0.0139]  [0.0135]  
Constant  2.6570*** 2.8233*** 2.4977*** 2.7113*** 
  [0.0121] [0.0014] [0.0120] [0.0016] 
R-squared  (within)  0.2533 0.2533 0.4057 0.4057 
R-squared  (between)  0.5164 0.0896 0.5419 0.0421 
R-squared  (overall)  0.4977 0.0973 0.5195 0.0405 43 
 
Breusch Pagan test for random effects (χ
2)  1923895***  1971342***  
F-test for fixed effects    843***    1013*** 
Hausman test (χ
2) 44.5347***  127.2156*** 
Note: Random effects GLS (specifications 1 and 3) and fixed effects (within estimator) OLS (specifications 2 and 4) 
for log real hourly wages. Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients and test values are significant at * 10%, ** 5%, 
and *** 1%. Reference group for entry age categories is entry age less than 25 years. Reference group for schooling 
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Figure 2: Predicted effects of entry age on the slope of wage-tenure profiles in personnel 
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Figure 3: Predicted effects of entry age on wage-tenure profiles in personnel data 
(random effects model) 46 
 
Table 5: Age and entry age categories in LIAB 
       Age categories (share in %) 
   Mean  Std.  Dev. <25  25-35 35-45 45-55  >55  Total 
Age 41.52  9.97  3.97  22.72  33.88  28.44  10.99  100.00 
Entry  age 31.47 9.18 26.61  41.17  22.93  8.41 0.88  100.00 
Difference 10.05  0.79  -22.64  -18.45  10.95 20.03 10.11 0.00 




Table 6: Tenure, entry age, interaction effect and wages in LIAB 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tenure  (years)  0.0125*** 0.0181*** 0.0130*** 0.0232*** 
  [0.00002] [0.00004] [0.00002] [0.00007] 
Entry age (years)      0.0097***  0.0121*** 
     [0.00002]  [0.00003] 
Entry age (years) * Tenure (years) / 100        -0.0352*** 
       [0.0002] 
Entry age 25-35 (dummy)  0.1451***  0.2272***     
 [0.0005]  [0.0007]     
Entry age 35-45 (dummy)  0.2229***  0.3265***     
 [0.0005]  [0.0007]     
Entry age >45 (dummy)  0.2582***  0.3524***     
 [0.0007]  [0.0009]     
Entry age 25-35 (dummy) * Tenure    -0.0073***     
   [0.00004]    
Entry age 35-45 (dummy) * Tenure    -0.0112***     
   [0.00006]    
Entry age >45 (dummy) * Tenure    -0.0120***     
   [0.0001]     
Log  likelihood  1431382 1454703 1429223 1439590 
LR-test for random effects (χ
2)  3.3e+06*** 3.3e+06*** 3.3e+06*** 3.3e+06*** 
Note: Random effects censored regressions (ML) for log nominal daily wages. All regressions include a female 
dummy, six schooling dummies, dummy for East Germany, dummies for collective contract and works council in 
firm, share of qualified workers in firm, dummy for firm founded before 1990, four firm size dummies, sixteen 
industry dummies, and five year dummies. Standard errors in brackets. Coefficients and test values are significant 
at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. Number of yearly observations is 3,997,114 for 1,526,575 full-time white-collar 
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Figure 5: Distribution of coefficients for tenure, entry age, and their interaction across 
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Figure 6: Distribution of coefficients for entry age for firms with steeper and flatter 
wage-profile adjustment in LIAB  
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